

Cover memo, [redacted]

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Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080006-1

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE [redacted]

1-10.2
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National Intelligence Officers

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for
Strategic Programs
Howard Stoertz

SUBJECT : Backfire

*Noted by
1/10/76
no action
required*

return to NIO/SP

DIA review(s) completed.

The attached memorandum from General Wilson summarizes technical uncertainties and questions concerning the CIA analysis of Backfire--in three sets of comments:

- The Summary and Conclusions and Overview of the report of an OSD panel of experts convened to review the CIA analysis.
- A list of "substantive incongruities" revealed so far by the Air Force critique of the CIA analysis.
- A paper on the "discrepancy" in the CIA Backfire B model.

The most important part of the memorandum for your appreciation at this time is paragraph 3 containing the conclusions of the OSD panel of experts, "that there is insufficient basis to alter the previously agreed views of Backfire capability while emphasizing the considerable uncertainty as to that aircraft's performance."

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

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It is expected that the WSSIC report on the Backfire (target date October) will convey more clearly than in General Wilson's memorandum, the technical uncertainties and disagreements concerning Backfire performance.



Howard Stoertz
NIO/SP

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI				
3	D/DCI/IC		X		
4	DDS&T		X		
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/NI	X			
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	Asst/DCI				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks: For review and advice to DCI. (Note: DDCI received a copy as a NFIB member.)

D/Executive Secretary.

29 Sep 76

Date

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

24 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Comments on CIA BACKFIRE Performance Analysis (U)

1. (U) Reference: DCI Letter, "BACKFIRE Performance Analysis", dated 15 September 1976.
2. (C) Sufficient analysis and critique of the new CIA BACKFIRE estimate and the analytical methodology utilized in its development have now been accomplished to warrant preliminary evaluation of same. It is believed important that NFIB's members and their principals be made aware of the significant technical uncertainties and questions which now exist regarding the CIA analysis.
3. (S) As noted in the reference, a panel of experts was recently tasked by OSD to review the CIA analysis. The introduction, summary, conclusions, and overview of the final report of the panel is enclosed for your information (Enclosure 1). Basically, it was felt that the CIA work did not provide a substantively adequate basis for altering the current DIA/FTD assessment of the aircraft. The OSD Panel concluded as follows:

"The DOD BACKFIRE Review Panel met on 25 and 26 August and received briefings on a CIA-sponsored new [redacted] study and on CIA analysis, conclusions, and revised estimates of the performance of the BACKFIRE. The Air Force also briefed the Panel on previous BACKFIRE studies and the preliminary results of their critique of the CIA/[redacted] analysis. On the basis of these briefings and subsequent discussions held on 3 September, the Panel concluded that there is insufficient basis to alter the previously agreed views of BACKFIRE capability, while emphasizing the considerable uncertainty as to that aircraft's performance."

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4/11/76
JWB
by HH
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6. (S) In light of the above enumerated uncertainties, it is believed that the previous intelligence community assessment of BACKFIRE performance capabilities should be retained until a complete and in-depth examination of the CIA analysis can be performed.


SAMUEL V. WILSON
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

2 Enclosures

1. Introduction, Summary and
Conclusions, and Overview of
OSD BACKFIRE Review Panel
Final Report (TS) 1 cy
2. Paper on Discrepancy in CIA
BACKFIRE B Model 
1 cy

cc:
Members NFIB

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